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Products Liability in Pennsylvania:
Precedents, Problems and Proposals
It is well established legal tradition that a party should not
benefit from one's own misconduct and that an individual is responsible for his own actions.

I.

Introduction

Pennsylvania judicially adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, section 402A,2 in the famous case of Webb v. Zern,I providing
1. Pinto, Comparative Responsibility-An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 115, 119 (1978).

2. § 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
3. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). Pennsylvania is among the following states that
have specifically adopted § 402A: Arizona, O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d
248 (1968); Connecticut, Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84 (1970); Florida, West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Hawaii, Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car
Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Hawaii 1970); Idaho, Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518
P.2d 857 (1974); Indiana, Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 258 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. App.
1970); Iowa, Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Kentucky, Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Mississippi,
State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Montana, Brandenburger v.
Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973); New Hampshire, Buttrick v.
Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d Ill (N.H. 1969); New Mexico, Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83
N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972); Oklahoma, Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353
(Okla. 1974); Oregon, Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Ore. 1967); Rhode Island,
Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255 (R.I. 1971); Texas, Darryl v. Ford Motor Co.,
440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); Washington, Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d
729 (1969); Wisconsin, Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
Not all states, however, have adopted § 402A. The following states have adopted the
substantial equivalent: Alaska, Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); California,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962);
Illinois, Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Louisiana, Weber v.
Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971); Michigan, Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Minnesota, Kerr v. Coming Glass Works,
284 Minn. 155, 169 N.W.2d 587 (1969); Nebraska, Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428,
191 N.W.2d 601 (1971); Nevada, Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 135 (Nev. 1970); New
Jersey, Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); New York,
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973); Ohio, Lonzrick v. Republic Steel

a basis for strict liability actions in products litigation. Since Webb v.
Zern, both the number of claims and the amount of damages
awarded to products liability have increased dramatically in Pennsylvania.4
Strict liability can be defended for its simplification of plaintiffs'
burden of proof,5 which previously was often insurmountable.6 But
a second rationale for the imposition of strict liability-that manufacturers should bear the risk because they are best able to absorb it
as a cost of business7-is repugnant to the sense of justice and fair
play of many persons.8 A need exists to interject greater equity into
strict products liability proceedings without sacrificing the policies
behind the adoption of strict liability. The equity referred to concerns the notion that one should be responsible only for the consequences of one's own faulty or negligent actions.9 Responsibility for
fault should be retained in strict products liability actions while preCorp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966); Tennessee, Ford Motor Co. v. London, 398
S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966).
4. Pennsylvania companies have experienced more than a ten-fold increase in product
liability premiums since 1965, from an average amount per year of $9,023 in 1965 to $118,531
in 1976. PENNSYLVANIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CRUNCH: How
PRODUCT LIABILITY AFFECTS PENNSYLVANIA COMPANIES 1 (1977). The number of claims
filed against Pennsylvania companies have increased almost five-fold, from an average of
seven per company in 1965 to a projected average of thirty-two in 1976. Id
This phenomenon is not confined to Pennsylvania. A survey taken of eight states (Arizona, California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin) by the
Department of Commerce shows that average damages for 1965-70 were $104,000, while the
average for 1971-76 was $222,000. There was also a 71% increase in litigation from the 196570 period to the 1971-76 period. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, I INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ITFR].
5. MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969)
(mechanical malfunction of a new car driven only 143 miles was evidence of a defective condition without proof of a specific defect); Spann Jr. v. Francis-Fords, Inc., 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 519
(C.P. Dauph. 1972) (bursting into flames of a four day old car, driven less than 100 miles, held
to be evidence of a defect); D'Antona v. Hampton Grinding Wheel Co., 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 120,
125, 310 A.2d 307, 310 (1973) ("the test [for whether a substantial change has occurred]. . is
whether the manufacturer could have reasonably expected or foreseen such an alteration").
6. See, e.g., Forde, ProductsLiability--Use of CircumstantialEvidence and Inferences to
Prove That a Product was Defective and That the Defect Existed When the Product Left Defendant's Control, 1972 TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 42, 44, 56; Rheingold, Proofof Defect in Product
Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REV. 325, 326 (1971); Note, 22 ME. L. REV. 189, 191-92 (1970);
Note, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 190, 193-95 (1975).
7. See, e.g., Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
8.
The manufacturer may not be the best risk distributor.
Even in a monopoly industry. . . certain products are subject to what economists
call an "elastic demand," i.e. a slight increase in price will cause a sharp reduction in
demand or will turn consumers to a substitute product. In such industries the product's price is by no means as adjustable as is assumed by the proponents of strict
liability.
The fact is, however, that most of our manufacturing industries are not monopolies in which the manufacturers can dictate price. . . . It is a common failing to overlook the small manufacturer. . . . [I]t is not sound thinking to assume . . . that
manufacturers are always in an economic position to pass on to the public the risks
arising from non-negligently-caused product defects.
Plant, Strict Liability of ManufacturersforInjuriesCaused by Defectsin Products-An Opposing
View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938, 946-47 (1957).
9. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text infra.

serving the evidentiary presumptions available under such actions.' 0

To elucidate this responsibility theme as manifested by and expressed in recent suggested changes in Pennsylvania products liability law, this comment will examine"I three particular aspects of
products liability where the need for equity is especially apparent.
The areas of statutes of limitation, 12 comparative fault' 3 and puni-

tive damages' 4 in strict liability actions will be analyzed and criticized, and guidelines and alternatives for change in the law will be

proposed. "
A.

Pennsylvania Law

Pennsylvania currently applies a two-year personal injury statute of limitations to strict liability actions, running from the date of
injury.' 6 This approach allows a plaintiff to initiate a strict liability
10. See note 6 supra and note 21 infra
11. This comment will not examine the history or development of strict products liability,
either in the United States generally, or in Pennsylvania, specifically, since that topic is adequately treated elsewhere.
See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Titus,
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A4 and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV.
713 (1970); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965); Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking
Some Products Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297 (1977).
For analysis limited specifically to Pennsylvania law, see Seidelson, The 4024 Defendant
and the Negligent Actor, 15 DUQ. L. REv. 371 (1977); Comment, SubstantialChange.- Alteration of a Product as a Bar to a Manufacturer's Strict Liability, 80 DICK. L. REV. 245 (1975);
Comment, Elimination of "Unreasonably Dangerous" From § 402A-he Price of Consumer
Safety?, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 25 (1975); Comment, ProductsLia4ilityin Pennsylvania, 13 VILL. L.
REV. 793 (1968); Comment, Recent Developments in ProductsLiability Law in Pennsylvania, 14
VILL. L. REV. 747 (1969); Note, 80 DICK. L. REV. 633 (1976).
12. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text inra.
13. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 124-28 and accompanying text infra.
15. One effect of these changes might be a reduction in products liability insurance for
companies reflecting the changes in philosophy that will be adopted. Currently, the Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce survey, supra note 4, reports that 25% of Pennsylvania's companies are experiencing difficulty "obtaining products liability insurance at anyprice." Over
half are having difficulty obtaining insurance "at a price they can afford." Id at 2.
16. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5524(2) (Purdon 1978) provides that an action "to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual" must be commenced
within two years from the date of injury.
The rationale is based on the equation of strict products liability with tort actions generally: "[SItrict liability (like other tort actions) triggers a statutory period accruing at the date
of the injury." Peeke v. Penn Cent. Trans. Co., 403 F. Supp. 70, 74 (E.D. Pa. 1975). For other
case law, see e.g., Mitchell v. Hendricks, 431 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Tucker v. Capital
Mach. Inc., 307 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Pa. 1969); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., - Pa.
Super. Ct. -, 389 A.2d 1148 (1978); Hekeler v. St. Margaret Memorial Hosp., 74 Pa. D. &
C.2d 568 (C.P. Alleg. 1976).
This interpretation is not limited to Pennsylvania courts:
Except for a decision handed down by the New York Court of Appeals [Mendel v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969)],
there has been unanimity of opinion that a cause of action based on strict liability in
tort accrues at the time of injury or damage and not when the product is sold. Thus,
negligence rules are being applied to determine when a cause of action accrues under
the strict liability in tort doctrine.
[1979] 1 PROD. LIAB. REP.(CCH) 4380.

action regardless of the date of the manufacture or sale of the product. 17 While the passage of time is excellent evidence for the defendant that the product was not defective, lapse of time alone cannot be
conclusive evidence that a product is not defective. 8 Thus, under

Pennsylvania law the plaintiff is never precluded from bringing a
strict liability action. 9
At some point, however, it becomes undesirable to allow a strict
liability claim to be brought against the manufacturer. 20 After a certain lapse of time the strict liability presumption of a defect, inferred
from the fact of injury, should cease because it becomes more likely
that failure was due to wear and tear, deterioration, or extended
2
use. '

B.

The Twelve Year Rule

The difficult challenge is to define the time when the presumption against defectiveness should arise. A proposed products liability
bill before the Pennsylvania House suggests retaining the two year
date-of-injury limitation, but establishing an absolute bar to all
products liability actions twelve years after the date the manufacturer either parted with possession or sold the product, whichever
occurs last.2 2 If this proposal were adopted, Pennsylvania would
17. If the Uniform Commercial Code statute of limitations were applied, all claims
would be time barred after four years regardless of whether a defect existed, and despite proof
of a defect. See U.C.C. § 2-725.
18. Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REV. 325, 340
(1971) (despite the passage of time, a possibility exists that a defect could be proved).
19. Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974) (plaintiff
who was injured by a twenty year old crane was not prevented from bringing a strict liability
action against the manufacturer since "prolonged use of a manufactured article is but one
factor . . . in the determination of.

. . whether [a defect in design or] manufacture proxi-

mately caused the harm").
20. Kircher, Products Liability-The Defense Position, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 276, 288
(1977).
21. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 345, 253 N.E.2d 207, 210, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (1969); Stein v. General Motors Corp., 58 Pa. D. & C.2d 193 (C.P. Bucks
1972), aff'dper curiam, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 751, 295 A.2d 111 (1972). See also Kircher, supra
note 20 at 289-90.
The closest analogy, perhaps to such a presumption is found in those statutes...
which conclusively presume that a child under a certain age cannot be negligent.
This presumption is based upon human experience that indicates that, as age decreases, so does the possibility of negligent conduct. It may be at least as reasonable
to presume that as the age of a product increases, while it is in safe use, so does the
likelihood that it was free of defect when it was first put into use.
22. See Pa. H. No. 1083, § 5537, Printer's No. 1209, 1979 Sess. (Apr. 25, 1979).
It appears that such a statute will pass constitutional muster. See Freezer Storage Inc. v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978) (the constitutionality of a 12-year statute of limitations for "deficiencies in construction," 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 5536 (Purdon
1978), was sustained against contentions that it constituted special legislation, deprived litigants of their right to bring suit, and unconstitutionally limited the amount that might be
collected for an injury).
Currently sixteen states have similar statutes of limitation for strict liability actions, dating
from the time of sale: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-551 (1978 Supp.) (12 years from the
date the product was first sold for use or consumption, unless the action is based on negligence
or warranty), Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (1978 Supp.) (rebuttable presump-

have one of the most liberal statute of limitations for products liabil-

ity actions.
Certain inequities would result, however, from the use of this
proposed statute. In the products liability field, where the defects
may not occur for long periods of time,23 it is "undesirable and un-

just to bar a plaintiff's remedy before his cause of action existed."24
Since the right to bring an action can only arise after the injury is

sustained by the plaintiff,25 some plaintiffs will be completely foreclosed by this bill from bringing their actions.2 6
Establishing the same statutory period for all products causes
tion of no defect 10 years after product is first sold for use or consumption), Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West 1979 Supp.) (8 years), Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 95.031 (1978 Supp.) (12 years from the date of delivery of completed product to its original
purchaser), Georgia, GA. CODE § 105-106(b)(2) (1978 Supp.) (10 years), Indiana, IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Bums 1978 Supp.) (10 years after delivery to the initial user or consumer),
Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. § 411.310 (Baldwin 1978 Supp.) (rebuttable presumption that not
defective if injury occurs 5 years after date of first sale to first consumer or 8 years after date of
manufacture), Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05(2) (West 1979 Supp.) (4 years), Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2(2) (1978 Supp.) (10 years), New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507-D:2(II)(a) (1978 Supp.) (12 years after the manufacturer of the final product parts
with its possession and control, or sells it, whichever occurs last), North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
3
STAT. § 1-15 (1977 Supp.) (10 years), Oregon, 1977 Or. Laws c. 843, H.B. 3039 p. (1977) (8
years), Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13(b) (1978 Supp.) (10 years after product first
purchased for use or consumption), South Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1
(1978) (6 years after the date of the delivery of the completed product to its first purchaser or
lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling such product), Tennessee, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 23-3703 (1978 Supp.) (10 years after first purchased for use or consumption, or I year
after the expiration of the anticipated useful life of product, whichever is shorter), and Utah,
UTAH CODE ANN. 78-15-3 (1977) (6 years from initial purchase or 10 years from date of manufacture).
The Uniform Products Liability Act would establish a ten year statute of limitations dating from the delivery of the completed product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not
engaged in the business of selling products of that type. See Draft, Uniform Products Liability
Act, § 109, 44 Fed. Reg. 2999-3000 (1979).
The limitation would not apply if the harm was caused by prolonged exposure or the
injury-causing aspect did not manifest itself within the ten year period. Id at § 109(B)(3)(d),
44 Fed. Reg. at 3000.
The proposed Pennsylvania Act would also allow suit beyond the 12-year period for
fraud, contractual agreement, and latent defects or injuries. Pa. H. No. 1083, § 5537(d),
Printer's No. 1209, 1979 Sess. (Apr. 25, 1979). The discussion and analysis in this comment
assumes that the defects are not fraudulent or latent.
23. The time a product may be in use before any incident occurs may be quite long.
Some 4% of the bodily injury claims, involving 10% of ultimate payment dollars, still
have not occurred 8 years after the date of manufacture of the product. Where capital goods are involved, the average time lapse from manufacture to occurrence is
more than 3 years longer than the overall average.
Insurance Services Office, Products Liability Closed Claim Survey: .4TechnicalAnalysirofSurvey Results-Highlights 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ISO Survey].
24. Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 145, 238 A.2d 169, 177 (1968). See
also Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 38, 68 A.2d 517, 535 (1949): "[It is
inconceivable that [the plaintiff] should be barred by lapse of time before the time when she
could have instituted a suit."
25. See Pollock v. Pittsburgh, Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R., 275 Pa. 467, 473, 119 A. 547,
549 (1923).
26. Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949). Denying a plaintifi's cause of action before it accrues may be constitutionally objectionable. Cf.Kallas
Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975) (statute of limitations
that included a different time limit for architects than for the owner of a building struck down
as unconstitutional).

further inequity. Many products are designed with a useful life expectation of more than twelve years in the normal course of events.

7

It would be patently unfair to an injured plaintiff to deny his products liability claim in the thirteenth year when a product is expected
to, and does, last thirty years. In the case of a short-lived product,
however, it would be equally unjust to the manufacturer to allow a

strict liability claim in the tenth year when28 the product is expected
to, and usually does, last only three years.

Prohibiting a plaintiff from bringing any products liability action after the twelfth year allows manufacturers of durable products
to gain a relative advantage over those who manufacture less durable products. The time-durable product manufacturer could escape
liability for injuries occurring during a period of time when the
product is expected to function normally, while the less-durable
product manufacturer may be forced to defend a strict liability action long after his product's expected useful life has expired. In this
situation the responsibilities of manufacturers are distorted.
C. A Useful Life Statute of Limitations.- Is It Possible?
The approach most consistent with the responsibility theme
would correlate the life expectancy of each product with its own
unique statute of limitations, thus allowing the manufacturer to insure against his expected risks in relation to the useful life of his
product, and eliminating the arbitrary cut-off point in products liability actions. 29 To insure that both the goal of the manufacturer (to
27. See note 23 supra
28. See, e.g., Kaczmarek v. Mesta Mach. Co., 463 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1972). Determining
when the presumption of a defect should shift to a presumption of a non-defect requires balancing the unfairness that could be caused to either party depending upon the cut-off point
chosen. Several states have statutorily decided when that presumption should shift. See note
22 supra.
29. Courts on occasion consider these factors. See, e.g., Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 336, 319 A.2d 914, 923 (1974) (emphasis added), which states, "The age
of an allegedly defective product must be considered in light of its expected useful life and the
stress to which it has been subjected. . .. [lin certain situations the prolonged use factor may
loom so large as to obscure all others in a case." See also Burchill v. Kearney-National Corp.,
468 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1972). In Burchill plaintiff sought recovery to injury caused by the
failure of a fitting. The court reversed a directed verdict for the defendant and remanded the
case largely because of evidence that "the T fitting was five to ten years old at the time of the
accident, and that such fittings were expectedto last. . . about 40 years." Id at 385 (emphasis
added).
Minnesota and Tennessee currently recognize by statute a useful life defense. MINN.
STAT. § 604.03(1978 Supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3702 (h) (1978 Supp.). The Minnesota
statute provides as follows:
[604.03] [Useful Life of Product.] Subd. 1. In any action for the recovery of
damages for personal injury, death or property damage arising out of the manufacture, sale, use or consumption of a product, it is a defense to a claim against a designer, manufacturer, distributor or seller of the product or a part thereof, that the
injury was sustained following the expiration of the ordinary useful life of the product.

Subd. 2. The useful life of a product is not necessarily the life inherent in the
product, but is the period during which with reasonable safety the product should be

be free from liability) and the goal of the plaintiff (to be allowed to
bring suit) are adequately balanced, there could be a strict liability
statute of limitations for the life expectancy of the product, which
would be objectively determined, and a cause of action in negligence
for plaintiffs injured after the expiration of the life expectancy period.3 0
This solution fulfills all the policy objectives of the responsibility theme. 3 A manufacturer's liability is limited because a cause of
action brought after the expiration of the life expectancy would have
little chance of succeeding because of the plaintiffs inability to use
the strict liability presumption and his consequent need to demonstrate a defect in a product after its useful life. Nevertheless, the
claim would not be foreclosed, and if the evidence shows a defect
caused by the fault of the manufacturer, he will be held responsible.
1. Attempting to Determine the Lyle Expectancy.-Determination of the life expectancy of the product may not be as difficult as it
might first appear. Major industries now have repair data and product life information that has been calculated for use in determining
output that could be used to arrive at an objective life expectancy
figure. Whether objective expectations for products can be usefully
expressed in statute of limitations for particular products, however,
can be seriously questioned.
a. Disclaimerapproach.-One attempt to utilize this information would force the manufacturers to put consumers on notice that
after a certain period (the "life expectancy" of the product as determined by the manufacturer), they will not be strictly liable for the
useful to the user. This period shall be determined by reference to the experience of
users of similar products, taking into account present conditions and past developments, including but not limited to (I) wear and tear or deterioration from natural
causes, (2) the progress of the art, economic changes, inventions and developments
within the industry, (3) the climatic and other local conditions peculiar to the user, (4)
the policy of the user and similar users as to repairs, renewals and replacements, (5)
the useful life as stated by the designer, manufacturer, distributor, or seller of the
product in brochures or pamphlets furnished with the product or in a notice attached
to the product, and (6) any modification of the product by the user.
The Tennessee statute determines "anticipated life" solely by reference to "the expiration
date" placed on the product by the manufacturer when required by law.
The Draft Uniform Products Liability Act § 109(A) 44 Fed. Reg. 2998-99 (1979) only
holds a product seller liable for harm caused by the product during its "useful safe life," which
may be determined by considering the same factors enumerated in the Minnesota statute with
the exception of the second.
30. See, e.g., Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some
Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 339 (1977). The author advocates that
[s]ince products are meant to last for a certain period of time and take normal abuse
within that period, a prima facie case of product failure should be made out when the
product fails within that period of time. The burden should then shift to the defendant to establish that the defect came into being through some cause that was abnormal in character and not a consequence of normal consumer use.
This useful life idea is also advocated by ITFR, supra note 4, at 47.
31. See note I and accompanying text supra
32. See generally, V.0. PACKARD, THE WASTE MAKERS 57-67 (1960). See also Twerski,
supra note 30, at 339.

malfunctioning of their product. This could be accomplished either
through disclaimer in the contract of sale or, in appropriate cases,
labeling.3 3 This approach would have the advantage of avoiding the
creation of an additional governmental or quasi-governmental
agency, and would probably allow a faster determination of the life
expectancies than could be expected from a government agency,
since the industry has much of the data available now.3 4
The drawback to the disclaimer approach, however, lies in the
disincentive for improving life expectancies in a monopolistic industry. 3- Furthermore, a powerful manufacturer would be able to lessen
the life expectancy of his products and thus, to some extent insulate
himself from liability. Thus, a disclaimer, since it is subject to manipulation by powerful manufacturers, appears to be a particularly
inappropriate way to determine the life expectancy of a product, and
concomitantly, a manufacturer's responsibility.
b. Independent agency approach.-An independent agency
could require disclosure of product information from the manufacturers and, along with testing and analysis, establish life expectancies
for each product. 36 After the date of the life expectancy has passed,
strict products liability actions could not be initiated. This approach
has the advantage of positing the determination of the life expectancy in a presumably more neutral source than either the manufacturer or the consumer.
Problems from stringent standards and lack of manufacturer incentive to improve these standards 37 should not arise in this system.
First, manufacturers would not be precluded from voluntarily increasing the agency-established life expectancy period, and it is expected that they would do so to gain a competitive advantage over
rivals. 38 Second, the agency could review the life expectancies periodically, perhaps every five years, to determine whether a longer period is warranted, either by changes in technology or by what the
manufacturers themselves indicate is feasible. Third, plaintiffs will
still be able to sue in negligence, and therefore, the manufacturer
33. See, e.g., ITFR, supra note 4, at 47-48. An additional practical problem is whether
the average consumer could comprehend this limitation and its effects.
34. An agency would have to go through the process of requesting and analyzing this
date independently of the manufacturers, which would duplicate effort and waste time.
35. See ITFR, supra note 4, at 47.
36. Two agencies presently perform similar functions: Underwriter's Laboratories and
Good Housekeeping Seal.
37. Cf. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson, Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972) (the court declared an entire industry to be lagging behind the feasible technology available).
38. If the additional loss incurred by advertising an extended warranty period is less than
the anticipated increase in profit generated by a growth in sales, an increased warranty period
would be to the manufacturer's benefit. If one manufacturer increased his profits by use of this
technique, other manufacturers would also strive to increase their warranties to grab a share of
the market.

must continue to be wary of producing inferior goods. 39 Last, manufacturers, out of concern for their reputation, will not often knowingly attempt to produce inferior goods' and should seek
improvements in the life expectancies.
Attempts by the manufacturers to unduly influence the agency
may be exerted and cause concern that life expectancies will be set
too low. These fears, however, should not be accorded great weight
because, generally, strong consumer groups are pulling in the opposite direction41 and even a strong manufacturing lobby probably
would not impose an unconscionably short life expectancy.42
2.

Substantive Barriersto the Useful Lfe Proposal-Although

the procedural difficulties may be overcome, substantive and practical problems abound and defeat the feasibility of this solution. The
major problem appears to be the enormous complexity involved in
attempting to "wear date" all products for all situations. If the product has many possible uses, the task could become extremely burdensome. For products with many component parts, the question
arises whether to establish a life expectancy for the final product, or
determine life expectancies for each component part, or average the
life expectancies of all the component parts to arrive at one life expectancy for the "product." Varying conditions of use, like temperature and moisture, also affect life expectancies. 43 A further problem
involves a product whose operating life expectancy is, say one year,
but which is used infrequently over several years by consumers."
For many new and recent products life expectancies can only be
predicted. Whether a plaintiff could bring a strict liability action after the expiration of the predicted life expectancy could always be
litigated, since the prediction could be wrong. Courts would thus
have to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether to allow a strict liability action-but this situation is the very one this proposal is attempting to avoid
39. See Comment, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 895, 911 (1976) ("If there was a certainty of widespread injury known to the manufacturer it is more likely that the product would be withdrawn in order to avoid extensive compensatory damages").
40. See Plant, Strict Liability ofManufacturersforInjuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938, 945 (1957) (The element which is most disturbing to manufacturers is not the potential judgment of legal liability but the injury which is
done to the reputation of the product and its producer). See also Hoenig, Product Designs and
Strict Tort Liability Is There a Better Approach, 8 S.W. U. L. REV. 109, 132 (1976).
41. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, U.S. Consumer Groups. Livelier than Ever, Dec. 6,
1976, at 90-91.
42. See notes 38 and 40 supra.
43. Kaczmarek v. Mesta Machine Co., 463 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1972) (a directed verdict
was granted when the court concluded that a two year old chain component was not defective
since it was used around acid and should have been regularly inspected).
44. Automobile manufacturers come closest to solving this problem by establishing a one
year or twelve thousand miles limitation.

Placing the burden back on the Court system indicates that this
proposal cannot yet be implemented. The problem thus becomes
one of establishing a statute of limitations, not dependent on the life
expectancy rationale, that will best retain the ideals and principles
underlying the responsibility theme.
D.

PracticalSolutions

1 Retain a Cause of Action in Negligence after a Fixed Strict
Liability Period-One way of approaching the goal of promoting
responsibility would be to bar only the strict liability action after
twelve years, although retaining a cause of action in negligence.45
One reason the strict liability doctrine arose was to ease the plaintiffs burden of proof' 6 through the presumption that proof of injury
is proof of a defect.4 7 Although the presumption becomes weaker as
time, use, and possible changes and alterations occur, 48 that weakening should not bar all attempts by the plaintiff to establish that a
defective product has injured him. The plaintiff should be permitted
to attempt to go forward with the full burden of persuasion, even
though that burden would be greater.
This solution would substantially fulfill the twofold policy behind a statute of limitations-preservation of evidence and establishment of an end to the burden of perpetual strict liability"-while
allowing a worthy plaintiff a chance, albeit a more difficult one, to
prove his case. This approach has the advantages of being easy to
administer; of avoiding an additional governmental agency; and of
denying a strict liability action to only a small number of plaintiffs."0
The manufacturer, however, would be subject indefinitely to potential liability, since a suit in negligence may be brought at any time.5"
2 Government Insurance after the Twelve Year Period-The
burden of potential liability for an indefinite period for a negligent
act, which is imposed by the solution of retaining a cause of action in
45. See Kircher, supra note 20, at 288. For Pennsylvania law, see note 16 and accompanying text supra. Arizona has recently adopted this idea in ARUz. REV. STAT. § 12-551 (1978

Supp.).
46. See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
47. See, e.g., Clarke v. General Motors Corp., 430 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Wissler
v. Amsley, 27 Cumb. L.J. 268 (Pa. C.P. 1977); Stewart v. Uniroyal, Inc. (No. 1), 72 Pa. D. &
C.2d 179 (C.P. Alleg. 1974).
48. See note 29 and accompanying text supra
49. For a discussion of the policies behind statute of limitations, see Johnson v. Star
Mach. Co., 530 P.2d 53, 56 (Ore. 1974). A possible third policy is more controlled insurance
rates through circumscribing the risk.
50. "[Only] 4% of bodily injury claims ... have not occurred 8 years after the date of
manufacture of the product. ISO, Products Liability Closed Claim Survey-Highlights 4
(1977).
51. Although the continuing possibility of suit helps maintain a sense of responsibility in
the manufacturer, the preservation of a set twelve-year period for strict liability actions does
distort the responsibility impact of this proposal. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text
supra.

negligence, is avoided by removing the twelve year limitation on
strict liability suits and establishing a state-administered fund to pay
claims arising after the twelfth year.5 2 The money would come from
a tax on the product, 53 appropriated according to the risk that an
injury due to defects will occur more than twelve years after the date
of the product's manufacture.
The reduction of manufacturers' product liability insurance re-

sulting from the limited liability period is one advantage eminating
from the use of this system. The decline in premiums should not be
completely offset by the tax, that should be minimal, since the risk of
injury after twelve years is minimal.54 This proposal comports better

with the responsibility theme, since, from the plaintiff's viewpoint, a
strict liability action is never eliminated, and from the manufacturer's viewpoint, liability is limited to twelve years. The manufacturer would be subject to an increase in his tax if the risk of defect
after twelve years increases.
This proposal is administratively more difficult to implement
than a system maintaining a negligence cause of action, however.
Computing the tax would entail reference to the frequency of claims
and to the product's life expectancy-a formidable task. This problem might be alleviated by a general tax on the manufacturer to be
apportioned to Pennsylvania in the amount of the estimated number

of products in the state.
III.

Comparative Fault

Maintaining a proper balance of responsibility is at the foundation of notions of comparative fault. Manufacturers should compensate-plaintiffs only to the extent that they are at fault for the injury.
Principles of comparative fault should be applied to strict liability

actions in Pennsylvania."
52. If the imposition of strict liability for product defects is to be founded on the
expediency and desirability of distributing or . . . socializing loss over the general
consuming public, would it not be a more honest course and would it not be more
economically and socially desirable, frankly to establish a governmental mechanism
through which such losses could be fairly distributed through taxation?
Plant, supra note 40 at 947-48. See also ITFR, supra note 4, at 102-113 (advocates federal
products liability insurance). The system would operate similar to Pennsylvania's state-operated medical malpractice insurance fund. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.101-1301.1006 (197980 Supp.). "It is the purpose of this act to make available professional liability insurance at a
reasonable cost ..
" Id. at § 1301.102.
53. The tax would be collected from the manufacturer, and could be distributed to each
state in proportion to the number of products sold in that state.
54. See note 50 supra.
55. One court has suggested a more accurate label:
We do note in passing that perhaps the term "comparative causation" ..
is a
conceptually more precise term than "comparative fault" since fault alone without
causation does not subject one to liability. However, because the term "comparative
fault" seems to be commonly accepted and used ... and since in this case we tie the
concept of comparative fault to the proximate cause, we shall not confuse the "thicket" of comparative fault and strict liability with yet another label.

A.

The Pennsylvania Interpretationof "Unreasonably Dangerous"

In 1975, in Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp.,56 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court attempted to extract all "negligence" con-

cepts from a strict liability action, by deleting the words

"unreasonably dangerous" from Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A( 1).57 The reaction to this decision was a general refusal by
the courts to follow that rationale.5 8 These post-Berkebile opinions

stressed that strict liability has retained a fault basis for liability; that
liability is "strict" only in the sense that the defendant's negligence
need not be proved in order to demonstrate a defective product. 59 A
defect must still be shown, and this implies some form of fault on the

part of the manufacturer" and acts as a delimiting principle, insulating the manufacturer from absolute liability.

t

The Pennsylvania

Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1139 (9th Cir.
1977).
56. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
57. Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 96, 337 A.2d 893, 900 (1975) (the
"unreasonably dangerous" phrase, implying use of the "reasonable man" standard, "has no
place in a strict liability case.").
58. Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Beron
explained the necessity of these words as follows:
[T]he inclusion of "unreasonably dangerous" serves two overlapping functions in the
§ 402A formulation of strict liability.... [I]t
denotes that the draftsmen of the Restatement intended to foreclose the possibility that "defective condition" might be
construed to include any characteristic of a product capable of inflicting injury. In
addition, it signifies that jurors should not resort to their intuitive understanding of
"defective condition" but rather that they should be guided by an objective standard
based on community expectations of product safety.
See also Greiner v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeseilschaft, 540 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1976); Posttape
Associates v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976); Bair v. American Motors
Corp., 535 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1976); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Mattocks v. Daylin, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 663 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F.
Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Serpiello v. Yoder Co., 418 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Bunn v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 415 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Zurzolo v. General Motors Corp.,
69 F.R.D. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Cornell Drilling Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 129,
359 A.2d 822 (1976). Contra, Pegg v. General Motors Corp., - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 391 A.2d
1074 (1978).
59. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459-60, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967). See cases cited
in note 58 supra. See also Hoenig, ProductDesigns and Strict Tort Liability.- Is There a Better
Approach?, 8 S.W. U. L. REV. 109 (1976).
60. "[T]he very concept of a 'defective' product, particularly one defective in design, requires some form of fault on the part of the manufacturer to allow such a defective design to
be used or product to be sold to the public." Brewster, ComparativeNegligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. OF AIR LAW & COM. 107, 110 (1976).
Everyone . . .would recognize that a manufacturer or other seller should not be
responsible for any and every hurt that a user or one in the vicinity of use suffers.
Therefore, courts that impose strict liability eliminating negligence as a requirement
for recovery must adopt some rules or principles as a substitute for negligence as a
delimiting principle.
Keeton, ProductsLiability--Liability Without Fault andthe Requirement ofa Defect, 41 TEX. L.
REV. 855, 858 (1973).
61. Pinto, supra note I at 118:
[T]he only available defenses which are based on the user's conduct are assumption
of risk and abnormal misuse.
The latter defense has been complicated by the injection of the issue of foreseeability, i.e., whether the consumer's use of the product was reasonably foreseeable to
the seller. . . .[Tihe actual distinction between foreseeable and unforeseeable mis-

Supreme Court, however, has recently explained and modified
Berkebile in Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co. 62 The court stated that the
words "unreasonably dangerous" have "no independent significance
and merely represent a label to be used where it is determined
that
63
the risk of loss should be placed upon the supplier.
Nevertheless, under the facts of Azzarello the court did not reject all use of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous," it simply refused to allow these words to be included in a jury instruction when
the question of a "defect" in a products liability case is at issue. The
court distinguished the judicial function from the jury function, and
concluded,
It is a judicial function to decide whether, under plaintiffs averment of the facts, recovery would be justified; and only after this
judicial determination is made is the cause submitted to the jury to
determine whether the facts of the case support the averments of
the complaint. . . . A standard suggesting the existence of a "defect" if the article is unreasonably dangerous. . . is inadequate to
guide a lay jury in resolving those questions.64
Azzarello is suggesting that the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" is helpful to the court in determining whether, on social policy
grounds, liability should be imposed;65 once that decision has been
made, the jury, as fact finder, determines whether the facts support
the plaintiffs claim of a defect in the product. The Azzarello court
has thus shifted the "fault" concept underlying strict liability actions
from the jury to the judge,66 and has placed the policy decisions
squarely upon the judiciary.
B.

Comparative Fault Should be Applied to Strict Liability Actions

In tort law "the most equitable result that can ever be reached
by a court is the equation of liability with fault. ' 67 A comparative
fault system serves sound public policy and is consistent with the
responsibility theme as well. 68 Comparative fault would not elimiuse is difficult to apply. Since the seller's foreseeability turns on his reasonableness,
the negligence concepts are reintroduced for the jury's resolution.
See also Keeton, supra note 60, at 858.
62. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
63. Id at 556, 391 A.2d at 1025.
64. Id at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026. The Court further emphasized that the Restatement
formulation "is primarily designed to provide guidance for the bench and bar, and not to
illuminate the issues for laymen." Id. at 557, 391 A.2d at 1026.
65. Id at 556, 391 A.2d at 1025.
66. See Maleson, NEGLIGENCE is DEAD BUT ITS DOCTRINES RULE Us FROM THE
GRAVE: A PROPOSAL TO LIMIT DEFENDANTS' RESPONSIBILITY IN STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS WITHOUT RESORT TO PROXIMATE CAUSE, 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 1 (1978).
67. Brewster, supra note 60, at 109 (quoting Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 438 (Fla.

1973)).
68.
Unlike negligence, the primary focus of product liability is on the product
rather than on notions of plaintiff's or defendant's fault. However, the product cannot be viewed in isolation. Any inquiry into product design must be made with reference to defendant's design process and plaintiff's own interaction with the

nate strict liability in products litigation6 9 since the plaintiff would

enjoy the same presumptions that he previously held." If the cause
of the injury were in part due to the plaintiffs own fault or negligence, 7 however, his recovery
would be reduced by the trier of fact
72

proportionately to that fault.

The enormous advantage of this change is the elimination or
curtailment of "the confusing and artificial distinctions between con-

tributory negligence, assumption of risk, abnormal use or misuse,
and failure to use reasonable care after knowledge of a defect is acquired."7 3 While it is just to hold a defendant strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective product because the consumer is presumed

powerless to protect himself against defective products marketed by
the manufacturer, 74 it is inequitable to hold that defendant liable to
the same extent when the negligent acts of the plaintiff contributed to

the injury.
C

5

PrecedentsforApplying ComparativeFault in Strict Liability
Actions
Currently, thirteen states apply a comparative fault system to

product. . . .So long as one remembers that it is the product that is being judged,
notions of reasonableness and foreseeability associated with negligence are not antithetical to strict liability.
14 DUQ. L. REV. 25 supra note I1,at 52. See also V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
347 (1974); Pinto, supra note 60.
69. V. Schwartz, supra note 68 at 95.
70. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42,45 (Alaska 1976).
See notes 49, 50 & 61 and accompanying text supra.
71. It is important to remember that the "fault" of the manufacturer and the "fault" of
the plaintiff are not the same "faults." In the former, the concern is with legal liability; in the
latter, the concern is with blameworthy conduct by the plaintiff.
In the case of products liability, the fault inheres primarily in the nature of the product. The product is "bad" because it is not duly safe .... [I]t is not necessary to
prove negligence in letting the thing get in the dangerous condition or in failing to
discover or rectify it. Instead, simply maintaining the bad condition or placing the
bad product on the market is enough for liability-whether it is called negligence per
se or strict liability. This is legal fault, and can be mixed with, and compared with,
fault of the morally reprehensible type. One does not have to stigmatize conduct as
negligent in order to characterize it as fault.
Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform ComparativeFault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373, 377 (1978).
In this context, those who argue that comparative fault is inappropriate in strict liability
actions, see, e.g., Levine, StrictProducts Liability and ComparativeNegligence.: The Collision of
Fault andNo-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337 (1977), simply fail to recognize how the comparative fault system will operate.
Comparing the fault or blameworthiness of the plaintiff will occur only after liability has
been imposed upon the defendant manufacturer. The jury will be asked to determine by what
percentage, if any, the plaintiff's verdict should be reduced because of the negligence of the
plaintiff in using the. product. See Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative
Negligence, 43 Mo. L. REv. 431 (1978). See also note 83 infra.
72. V. Schwartz, supra note 68 at 208 (1974 & Supp. 1978).
73. Brewster, supra note 60, at 117. These concepts would no longer be needed to determine liability because they would be used only to assess the proportionate liability percentages
and would no longer constitute a complete defense.
74. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 553, 391 A.2d 1020, 1023-24 (1978).
75. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976).

strict liability actions.76 Pennsylvania has enacted a modified comparative negligence statute to be applied in negligence cases." In the
field of strict liability it has adopted comment n78 of section 402A,
76. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976) (pure
type); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978)
(pure type); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (modified type); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 79 (D. Hawaii 1961), a,#'d, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Sun
Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Gilbertson v.
Tryco Mfg. Co., 492 F.2d 958 (8th Cir. 1974) (Minn.) (modified); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (Miss.) (pure); Hagenbuch v. Snap-on Tools, Corp., 339 F.
Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1976) (modified type); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463, 251
A.2d 278 (1969); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976 Supp.) (pure type); Ritter v.
Narragansett Electric Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977) (pure type when misuse is used as a defense); and Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) (modified type).
Three other states have adopted comparative fault statutes that are not limited in their
language to negligence actions: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763-65 (1975); Maine,
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14 § 156 (1965); and Rhode Island, 2A R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1971).
Connecticut has statutorily prohibited the use of comparative fault as a defense in strict
liability actions (1977 Conn. Pub. Acts 77-335).
Two of three decisions that have declined to apply comparative negligence to strict liability relied on state comparative negligence statutes, which were expressly confined to "negligence" actions. Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (Nebraska); Kirkland v.
General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). See also Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835
(Colo. App. 1976).
77. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (Purdon 1978):
§ 7102 Comparative Negligence
(a) General Rule.-In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have
been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his
legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence
ofthe defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
Thus far, no cases have been decided under this statute. Several authors have discussed it,
however. See, e.g., Sherman An Analysis of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute, 38
PiTr. L. REV. 51 (1976); Seidelson, The 4024 Defendant and the Negligeni Actor, 15 DUQ. L.
REV. 371 (1977); Note, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 531 (1977).
Other states that apply a comparative fault system to negligence actions include the following: Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975) (pure); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.
3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (pure); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1973) (pure); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27.1765 (1977 Supp.) (lesser than); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1321-111 (1973)(not as great as); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1979) (not
greater than); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968) (avoided by ordinary care); HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 663-31 (1975 Supp.) (not greater than); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 (1979) (not as great as);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (Supp. 1976) (less than); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (1978-79
Supp.) (equally at fault); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (1979 Supp.) (not greater than);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (1979 Supp.) (not as great as); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972)
(pure); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 58-607.1 (1975 Supp.) (not greater than); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-1151 (1964) (slight vs. gross); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1977) (not greater than); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.7a (1973 Supp.) (not.greater than); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West
Supp. 1979) (not greater than); N.Y. Civ. PiAc. LAW §§ 1411-13 (McKinney 1976) (pure);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975) (not as great as); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (1978-79
Supp.) (lesser than); ORE. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1978-79 Supp.) (not greater than); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968) (concurrent imprudence); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1978 Supp.)
(pure); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967) (slight vs. negligent); TEx. Civ. STAT. art.
2212a (1978-79 Supp.) (not greater than); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977) (not as great
as); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973) (not greater than); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010
(1976) (pure); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1979-80 Supp.) (not greater than); Wvo. STAT. § 11-109 (1977) (not as great as); Huff, Defense Strategies with Comparative Negligence, 44 INS.
COUNSEL J. 124 (1977).

78.

Comment n reads in pertinent part: "Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a

which rejects contributory negligence as an available defense. 79

Pennsylvania courts, however, do recognize assumption of risk as a
defense to a strict liability suit,"° holding that "if the buyer knows of
the defect and voluntarily and unreasonablyproceeds to use the product or encounter a known danger, this [will] . . . constitute a complete defense to the action.""
Pennsylvania, in effect, makes some comparison of the fault of
the parties through use of this contributory negligence-assumption of

risk dichotomy. A finding of assumption of the risk of a defective
product results from a determination by the court that plaintiff's
"fault" was greater than the defendant's "fault" and recovery is denied. If the plaintiff's "fault" was less than the defendant's "fault,"
the court finds only contributory negligence, which is denied as a
defense in strict liability, and recovery is allowed. Pennsylvania thus

utilizes a modified comparative fault system in its strict liability decisions.
Thus, adoption of a true comparative fault system would not
disrupt the policy of fault comparison now implicit in the assumption of risk--contributory negligence dichotomy. It would allow the
courts openly to apportion the fault proportionately, rather than em-

ploying fault in an all-or-nothing manner to ascertain if full recovery
or no recovery is warranted.
California, which has completely removed from section 402A
all use of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous," has specifically held
that comparative fault principles will be applied in strict liability
cases.8 2 The court observed that strict liability is imposed for the
dual purpose of relieving injured consumers from problems of proof
defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product,
or to guard against the possibility of its existence."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A, Comment n (1965).
79. McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975) (the driver's
contributory negligence was not a defense to alleged defective design of a steering wheel).
A California court has noted that
under the present law, which recognizes assumption of risk as a complete defense to
products liability, the curious and cynical message is that it profits the manufacturer
to make his product so defective that in the event of injury he can argue that the user
had to be aware of its patent defects. To that extent the incentives [for safety] are
inverted.
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 738, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
387 (1978).
80. Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966) (whether plaintiff assumed the risk of driving a truck that tended to lock wheels was a jury question). Cf. Green v.
Sanitary Scale Co., 431 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1970) (held failure to charge on assumption of risk in
a products liability charge was reversible error).
81. 423 Pa. at 327, 223 A.2d at 748. Yet "if the plaintiffs fingers become placed in a
dangerous position in the machine by reason of inadvertence, momentary inattention or diversion of attention, . . . this would not amount to assumption of risk, [and the plaintiff can
recover]." Elder v. Crawley Book Machinery Co., 441 F.2d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 1971).
82. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978).

inherent in pursuing negligence causes of action, and spreading the
cost of compensating otherwise defenseless victims throughout society. The court concluded that these goals "will not be frustrated by
the adoption of comparative principles."83
D.

Arguments againstAdopting Comparative Fault are
Unpersuasive

Although potential practical and procedural problems have
been advanced in conjunction with the suggested adoption of comparative fault in strict liability actions,84 these problems are purely
speculative and unfounded. First, the effect of adoption of a comparative fault system on insurance rates has been questioned. To
argue that insurance rates will increase, one must assume that in the
large bulk of cases the plaintiff is more negligent than the defendant.
No reason exists to assume this. 85 Even if this were true, adoption of
comparative fault "would not have as much effect [on insurance
rates] as rapid growth of population."86
Second, an argument has been made that the manufacturer's
product defect becomes an intervening cause, insulating the plaintiff's negligence as a cause of the injury. In the case of a bystander,
however, this "insulation" theory has been discarded,87 with the result that both the plaintiff and defendant are liable to the bystander.
Since the manufacturer's defect is not deemed an intervening cause
as against the bystander it makes little sense to argue that the plaintiff's fault cannot be compared to the defendant's fault in the absence
of a bystander. This anomalous approach would require the defendant manufacturer to pay the entire damages if only the plaintiff were
involved, but would allow a proportionate reduction in payment to
the extent of the plaintiff's fault when a bystander becomes involved.
83. Id at 736, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The court added,
[P]laintifl's recovery will be reduced only to the extent that his own lack of reasonable
care contributed to his injury. . . . [We do not permit plaintiff's own conduct relative to the product to escape unexamined, and as to that share of plaintiffs damages
which flows from his own fault we discern no reason of policy why it should.., be
borne by others.
Id at 737, 575 P.2d at 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.

Although the court considered the argument that strict liability, which is not founded on
negligence or fault, is inhospitable to comparative principles, the court dismissed it, holding
that the distinction was a semantic one that should not deter attaining a just result. Id at 737,
575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
84. The four arguments presented herein are presented in McKinnon, The CaseAgainst
Comparative Negligence, 28 CALIF. ST. B.J. 23 (1953) and Gilmore, Comparative Negligence
from a Viewpoint of Casualty Insurance, 10 ARK. L. REV. 82 (1956).
85. See Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L.
REV. 689, 718 (1960).
86. Id at 728.
87. Wagner v. Studt, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 743 (C.P. Cambria 1973). See also Fedorchick v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Cf Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 428 Pa.
334, 237 A.2d 593 (1968); Flavin v. Aldrich, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 420, 250 A.2d 185 (1968).

A third argument runs that strict liability is necessarily and
properly imposed as a penal device to punish a defendant who produces a defective product and should not be diluted by use of comparative fault principles. It is inequitable, though, to "punish" a
manufacturer with total liability when he is only partially at fault.88
Further, the imposition of punitive damages can be imposed, if necessary, to punish manufacturers. 89
Fourth, concern has been expressed that the defendant should
be denied the comparative fault defense because he has "unclean
hands" due to the production of a faulty product. This argument
loses its force when one considers that a court will not deny recovery
to a negligent plaintiff who is also pleading his case with unclean
hands.9" Thus, in the interests of equality of treatment, the manufacturer should not be denied his day in court.
Last, it is contended that manufacturers will produce inferior
products under a comparative fault system. The merit of this argument is questionable because of the compelling reasons that exist for
safety promotion, protection of the manufacturer's reputation, 9' and
the invocation of punitive damages for any knowing production of
inferior products. 92 Furthermore, the manufacturer retains incentive
to make defect-free products because even if the plaintiff's conduct
contributed to his injury, the manufacturer will still be liable for his
fault in producing a defective article. 93
Thus, a comparative fault system is a theoretically and equitably feasible approach, and, as will be demonstrated, can be practically applied.
E

What Type of Comparative Fault System should be Adopted?

1. Description of Comparative Fault System.-Comparative
fault systems fall into three major types: (1) pure; (2) "not greater
than"; and (3) "not as great as." 94 The pure type allows recovery in
exact proportion to the fault attributable to the plaintiff and defendant.95 The second and third types are modifications of the pure sys88. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 122-29 and accompanying text infra
90. See notes 77-79 and accompanying text supra. In Pennsylvania, contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a bar to recovery. Baglini v. Pullman, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D.
Pa. 1976).
91. See note 40 supra.
92. See notes 122-23 and accompanying text infra.
93. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978). See also note 83 supra.
94. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 43-82. Other types include the "equal division" rule
(when both plaintiff and defendant are negligent, damages are divided equally), and the
"slight-gross" system (plaintiff cannot recover if his negligence is gross, but can recover if his
negligence is only slight). Id
95. Thus, a plaintiff who is 70%W
contributorily negligent can recover 30% of his damages
from the defendant.

tem, and either allow plaintiff to recover the entire amount of his
damages from the defendant, or precludes recovery completely, depending upon the extent of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Under the second type the plaintiff can recover his damages
even if he is as much as fifty percent contributorily negligent, while
in the third type the plaintiff can recover only if he is less than fifty
percent contributorily negligent.9 6 Under either of these modified

systems, plaintiffs negligence of fifty-one percent or more precludes
recovery.
A current proposal in the Pennsylvania House would adopt the
"not greater than" modified system.9 7 This proposal should be re-

jected in favor of a pure comparative fault system, as exemplified in
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. 9 8 To understand why the pure
96. While the theoretical differences between these systems are not great, they become so
in practice:
Theoretically, only a very small percentage of plaintiffs would be found exactly 50%
negligent, so that the difference between "not as great as" and "not greater than"
language would be relatively insignificant. However, as a matter of practice, juries
vexed with the problem of apportioning fault between two negligent parties often
return verdicts that they are equally at fault. The result is particularly devastating in
states like Colorado, Hawaii, and Massachusetts, which follow the Wisconsin practice of requiring special verdicts apportioning negligence but at the same time keeping from the jury information as to the legal effect of its apportionment. In these
states, the jury may in fact believe that a verdict apportioning fault equally will result
in an award to the plaintiff of half his damages.
V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 77-78.
97. § 8364. Comparative Responsibility in Product Liability Actions.
(a) General Rule.-In any product liability action the responsibility of the person suffering the harm. . . shall not bar recovery for the harm sustained where it was
not greater than the responsibility of the party against whom recovery is sought.
However, any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
responsibility attributable to the person recovering.
Pa. H. No. 1083 supra note 22 at § 8364 (emphasis added).
98. The Act reads in pertinent part as follows:
Uniform Comparative Fault Act
Section 1. [Effect of Contributory Fault]
(a) In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to
person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant
diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages
for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not
bar recovery ...
(b) "Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property. . . or that subject a person to strict liability . ..
Section 2. [Apportionment of Damages)
the
(a) In all actions involving fault of more than one party to the action, ...
indicourt. . . shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories, .
cating:
(1) the amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to recover if
contributory fault is disregarded; and
(2) the percentage of the total fault of all of the parties to each claim that
is allocated to each claimant [and] defendant ...
(b) In determining the percentage of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the
nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT,

§§

1(a) & 2(a), (b) (1977).

Pennsylvania could also adopt a pure comparative fault system judicially. McCown v.
International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975) (court refused to apply comparative fault to strict liability actions, not because it did not have the power to do so, but only

system is superior to the "not greater than" or any modified system,

one need only examine the policy and effect of each system.
2. Pure and Modified Compared-The pure comparative fault
system is most consistent with the responsibility theme since the defendant is responsible only for the damages caused by his fault. The

only quarrel leveled against the pure system has been the moral objection that it is improper to allow someone whose fault is greater to
recover from one whose fault is less.99 This argument misunderstands the functioning of the comparative fault system. It is equitable that when an injury is caused by two people, each is liable to the
extent of his responsibility in contributing to the injury.I °°
The modified system, on the other hand, compares fault only if
the plaintiffs negligence is fifty percent or less, which "distorts the
very principle it recognizes, . . . that persons are responsible for
their acts to the extent their fault contributes to an injurious re-

sult."11 There is nothing just in requiring the defendant to pay fiftyone percent of the plaintiff's damages when the plaintiff is forty-nine
percent at fault and allowing the defendant freedom from liability
when he is forty-nine percent at fault and the plaintiff is fifty-one

percent at fault. 102

Contrary to the fears of some commentators, 0 3 neither court
costs nor congestion will increase under a pure comparative fault
system. A "before and after" survey in Arkansas showed that the
effect on cost and administration of instituting the pure system was
negligible." a It may even be that the modfied system, rather than
the pure system, would tend to clog the court system at the appellate
level, because of numerous appeals on the crucial determination of
whether plaintifi's negligence was equal to defendant's negligence. 105
because it felt that to do so would be unwise). See also Decker, Some Random Observations
about ComparativeNegligence and the Trial Processin Wisconsin, 1 CONN. L. REV. 56 (1968);
Parkhill, 4 Better Comparative Negligence Rule, 56 A.B.A.J. 263 (1970).
99. See, e.g., Ghiardi & Hogan, ComparativeNegligence-The Wisconsin Rule andProcedure, 18 DEFENSE LAW J. 537 (1969). See also V. SWARTZ, supra note 68, at 344-48.
100. The plaintiffs liability is paid by the decrease in his recovery from the defendant.
101. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 828, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
875 (1975).
102. Vincent V. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 125, 177 N.W.2d 513, 520 (1970). See
also Comment, Tort Defenses to Strict Products Liability, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 924, 943
(1969) ("Even under comparative negligence a finding that plaintiff and defendant are equally
at fault will bar recovery. . . . [S]uch a result seems to place only secondary emphasis on the
policy of consumer protection").
103. See note 83-84 supra, See also Ghiardi, ComparativeNegligence-The CaseAgainsta
Missirssppi-type Statute, 10 FOR THE DEFENSE 61 (1969).
104. Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas:..4 "Beforeand After' Survey, 13
ARK. L. REV. 89 (1959). Further, "the experiences in Mississippi, various Canadian provinces
and England indicate that pure comparative negligence does not increase judicial costs." V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 68 at 347.
105. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 828, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
875 (1975) notes that the numerous appeals on this point have resulted in using "arcane classifications of negligence according to quality and category."

Possible jury confusion under a pure comparative fault system has
not occurred, since juries are able to operate effectively under the
comparative fault system. 0 6 As an added precaution, however, bifurcation, 0 7 jury instructions or special interrogatories °8 could be
utilized.
F

Comparative Fault and the CollateralSource Rule

The pure comparative fault system can also operate effectively
when 'the third party insurance company of the plaintiff enters the
equation via the collateral source rule. 0 9 Pennsylvania does not allow evidence of collateral sources of benefits to be admitted at trial
to mitigate the plaintiff's recovery against the defendant." 0 A recent
proposal in the Pennsylvania House, however, would permit evidence of collateral benefits to be admitted in products liability ac-

tions."I' Such proposals have typically been justified by claims that
insurance rates will be reduced" 2 and by the inequity involved in
permitting a plaintiff to receive a double recovery." 1 3 Collateral benefits should be admitted, it is argued, because liability is imposed on
the defendant only for the harm in fact.
These arguments, however, are unpersuasive. The plaintiff's
prudence in obtaining insurance should not become a windfall to the
manufacturer selling a defective product. Since insurance benefits
have become widespread, elimination of the rule would mean that
manufacturers could gamble that potential plaintiffs will have insurance and, by computing the amount that the average person obtains,
106. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 331, 579 P.2d 441, 442, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 550, 555 (1978); Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Akaska 1975).
107. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products,44 Miss. L.J. 825, 838-40
(1973).
108. See Kircher, supra note 20 at 285.
109. The Collateral Source Rule provides that damages are to be awarded to an injured
person without regard to compensation he has received from other sources. The Rule would
thus permit double recovery for the plaintiff if he receives reparation from a collateral source.
See, e.g., Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1964). The rationale of the Rule is to
insure that the plaintiff is made whole and to burden the tortfeasor with the loss.
Despite its near unanimous acceptance, see, e.g., Annot., 11 A.L.R. 3d 1115 (1967), the
rule is a prime target for attack by commentators.
See, e.g., Fleming, The CollateralSource Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 1478 (1966), suggesting that the collateral source rule, having originated to protect the
plaintiff from paying for injuries caused by the defendant out of his own savings, is no longer
needed because of the widespread use of insurance. "Tort recovery has thus long ceased to be
the only, or even the principal, source of repairing accident losses, besides the private resources
of the victim himself." Id at 1480. See also Note, 77 HARV. L. REV.741 (1964).
110. See, e.g., Wojciechowski v. Long-Airdox Div. of Marmon Group, Inc., 488 F.2d II1
(3d Cir. 1973) (collateral medical benefits not admissible).
I11. Pa. H. No. 1083, § 8362, Printer's No. 1209, 1979 Sess. (Apr. 25, 1979).
112. "[Ellimination of double payments of certain items in the average personal injury
claim would result in premiums savings of between 15 and 19 percent," Kircher, supra note 20,
at 312.
113. "The continuation of the Collateral Source Rule means that seven or eight of every
ten successful claimants will recover at least twice for some economic losses." Id at 312. See
also note 109 supra.

would enjoy a "deductible" of that amount in actions brought
against them. While this might fulfill the goal of compensation to

the plaintiff, it would undermine the maintenance of responsibility
within the comparative fault system by forcing the plaintiff, through
his insurance company, to pay for injuries caused by the fault of the
manufacturer."

4

Thus, evidence of compensation independently se-

cured by the plaintiff should remain inadmissible, and the manufacturer should continue to bear the costs of injuries caused by his
defective product.
G.

ComparativeFault and Workmen's Compensation
Whether to admit collateral sources of compensation becomes

slightly more complex in a suit by an employee plaintiff against a
third party manufacturer who seeks to involve the employer, or in

the situation in which an employer seeks indemnity from the manufacturer for workmen's compensation benefits paid. Pennsylvania
law prohibits the manufacturer from seeking contribution or indem-

nity against a negligent employer." 5 Pennsylvania law also prohibits the manufacturer from joining the employer as an additional
defendant in an action by the employee." 6 These laws are antithetical to the proper allocation of responsibility" 7 and should be repealed in favor of allowing indemnity in amounts determined by

application of fault principles." 8
114. Cf. Fleming, supra note 109. This situation would probably discourage the manufacturer from increasing the safety of his products.
115. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (1979-80 Supp.), which provides in pertinent part:
(b) In the event injury or death to an employe is caused by a third party, then
such employe.

. .

may bring.

. .

his action at law against such third party, but the

employer, . . . shall not be liable to a third party for damages, contribution, or indemnity in any action at law.
Bell v. Koppers Co., 481 Pa. 454, 458, 392 A.2d 1380, 1382 (1978) noted that the effect of this
law is to preclude the presentation of evidence concerning the employer's negligence that
might show he alone had caused the injury or that he and the third party are jointly liable.
The section foreclosed adjudication of the liability of the employer.
116. Arnold v. Borbonus, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 390 A.2d 271, 273 (1978): "We agree
that the 1974 amendment to § 303(b) [481(b)] manifests a broad legislative intent to bar the
joinder of an employer as an additional defendant." Section 481(b) does not preclude the
employer from seeking subrogation rights. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671 (1979-80 Supp.);
Id at -, n.7, 390 A.2d at 273.

117. Indemnity principles are consistent with the responsibility theme:
The right of indemnity rests upon a difference between the primary and secondary
liability of two persons each of whom is made responsible by law to an injured party.
The right to indemnity enures to a person, who without active fault on his own part,
has been compelled by reason of some legal obligation to pay damages occasioned by
the negligence of another.
Burbage v. Boiler Eng'r & Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 326, 249 A.2d 563, 567 (1969) (boiler
manufacturer received indemnification from the manufacturer of a valve within the boiler).
See also Stewart v. Uniroyal, Inc. (No. 2), 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 206 (C.P. Allegheny 1975) (the
seller of a defective tire-changing machine was entitled to indemnification from the manufacturer).
118. A pure comparison of fault among multiple defendants would not affect the recovery
of the injured plaintiffRegardless of the "label" used to describe the conduct of each of a series of multiple

An American Insurance Association proposal would impose a
modified comparison of fault between the employer and the manufacturer. 119 The proposal allows the manufacturer an automatic
credit in the amount of the workmen's compensation benefits payable to the injured employee. The employer, although immune from

third party actions by the manufacturer, must always pay the full
amount of the workmen's compensation benefits and can never seek
indemnity from a third party manufacturer, even though the em-

ployer was non-negligent and, therefore, not responsible for the
worker's injury. This proposal is defended on several grounds: (1)
often the employer is negligent; (2) the proposal encourages greater

employer investment in safety; (3) it keeps the employer insulated
from third party actions for indemnity; and (4) it is less complicated
20
and less expensive to administer.1

The rationale of the AIA proposal is unconvincing for several
reasons. That employers are on occasion negligent' 2' is not an argument that all employers should be held liable whenever an employee
is injured. Employers who are without fault should not be forced to

support the manufacturer who produces a defective product. Furthermore, the means by which this proposal would encourage greater
employer safety are difficult to understand. The employer will always be responsible to the full extent of the workmen's compensadefendants in a products action, if each is found liable to the plaintiff--on whatever
theory-it may be said that their culpable conduct combined to produce the plaintiff's damages. If the plaintiff is made whole, nothing should prevent defendants
from adjusting, among themselves, their common liability to the plaintiff.
Kircher, supra note 20, at 300.
Of course, the employer should not be held liable beyond the limit of his workmen's
compensation benefits since that amount is governed by the "bargain" between the employer
and the employee.
Justice Spaeth, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arnold gives a good example
of how the apportionment of fault between the employer and manufacturer would operate:
[WIhere the employer and a third party are equally negligent, the third party pays
only his half of the judgment and the employer pays up to the compensation maximum in fulfillment of his half of thejudgment. Thus, no one bears more than his fair
share of the liability judgment; to the extent that the employer bears less than his
share, and the employee thereby gets less than his due, this is what the Act contemplated in the "bargain" between the employee and employer, the one getting an assured recovery, the other getting a fixed limit on liability. It is unjust to make the
third party fill the gap between what the employee gets and what he needs to be made
whole, for the third party was not part of the bargain; he gained nothing from it.
Arnold v. Borbonus, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, - n.4, 390 A.2d 271, 275 (1978). See generaly
Larson, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: THIRD PARTY'S ACTION OVER AGAINST EMPLOYER,
65 N.W.U. L. REV. 351 (1970).
119. American Insurance Association, ProductsLiability Legislative Package 51 (1977).
120. Id at 53, 59.
121. A nationwide survey of insurance companies reveals that only a small portion of
claims involved possible employer negligence:
[Twenty-four percent] of the total dollar amount paid for all bodily injury claims are
paid in cases involving possible employer negligence. In most of these cases, recovery or some contribution to the payment would have been sought from the employers
by the product liability insurers if such recovery were not prevented by the sole remedy rule.
ISO Survey, supra note 23, at 5.

tion limits whether he is negligent or not. Therefore, since his
conduct will not be examined, he has no incentive to increase safety
measures except in keeping with the constant concern to hold accidents to a minimum to prevent having to distribute workmen's compensation at all. Finally, while technically the proposal might be
easier to administer, injustice
should not be perpetuated by a plea to
12 2
simplicity.
administrative
In comparison, the pure comparative fault system applied in the
workmen's compensation area, unlike a modified system, would encourage greater safety precautions by the employer, for the non-negligent employer could recover from the negligent manufacturer and
thus, has incentive to conduct business in a more prudent manner.
The manufacturer also has incentive to increase safety measures, for
the non-negligent manufacturer could recover from the negligent
employer up to the full extent of the workmen's compensation limits. 123

IV.
A.

Punitive Damages
Origin and PennsylvaniaLaw

Punitive damages are not precluded by a strict liability action. 2 4 In Pennsylvania, for punitive damages to lie, the prohibited
acts must have been done "with a reckless indifference to the interest
of others. . . . 'Recklessness'. . . requires a finding of a readily perceptible danger and a conscious choice on the part of the alleged
wrongdoer to act despite clear knowledge of a highly probable risk
of serious harm."12 5 Furthermore, punitive damages must "bear a
122. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
123. The ability to argue the employer's negligence also allows the manufacturer a chance
to reduce his own liability and, concomitantly, the amount of money he would have to pay in
damages. Brescia v. Ireland Coffee-Tea, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The Brescia
court notes the possibilities afforded the manufacturer:
If supported by the evidence, it is certainly not error for a defendant to argue, in
support either of its own freedom from liability or its attempt to pass on or spread its
liability, that a third party's actions were wholly or partially responsible for a plaintiff's injuries, even if that third party may be immune from suit by the plaintiff.
Id. at 678.
124. Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 264 (E.D. Pd. 1976).
One commentator has suggested that punitive damages are essential to products liability actions, especially if comparative fault principles are adopted:
If we are to consider comparative negligence as a factor in a product liability case, we
may be reducing the defendant's financial exposure to the point where maintaining
the design defect becomes economically prudent. . . . [W]e should not remove punitive damages from the plaintiff's arsenal in product liability litigation when dealing
with a reckless or malicious tortfeasor. The argument would seem to be particularly
strong when a defendant may otherwise be protected from facing the full force of
compensatory damages.
Twerski, THE USE AND ABUSE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 10
IND. L. REV. 797, 802 (1977).

125. Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 263, 266 (E.D. Pa.
1976). See also § 908 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Comment b (1965).

reasonable relationship to the amount of actual damages. "126
The meaning of "reasonable relationship," "clear knowledge"
and "highly probable risk" is, of course, subject to dispute in any
given case. Clearly, though, juries are willing to award larger and
larger amounts of punitive damages, and the courts are acquiescing. ' 27 The effect of these large awards lies less in deterrence or punishment to the manufacturer, and more in both higher costs to
consumers 128 and punishment to the shareholders of the corporation, 29 which effect is inconsistent with maintaining the manufacturer's sense of responsibility.
The magnitude of awards and publicity accompanying recent
cases involving punitive damages is disturbing for several reasons:
(1) the manufacturer who distributes his product to a great many
people may be subject to multiple punitive damages lawsuits, 30 resulting in possible "overkill";' (2) the spectre of large recoveries in
punitive damages may invite lawsuits and discourage settlement of
claims; 32 (3) courts, in applying punitive damages, may be effectuating risk-utility decisions about a product that would be better left to
experts in the field;' 3 3 (4) punitive damages are imposed by juries
126. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1974). Only two cases in
Pennsylvania have dealt with the issue of punitive damages as applied to products liability
actions: Hoffman, restricting punitive damages to a reasonable relationship, and Thomas v.
American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976), denying punitive damages. See also Comment, The Relationshipof Punitive Damagesand Compensatory Damages in
Tort Actions, 75 DICK. L. REV. 585 (1971).
This situation is not confined to Pennsylvania. "There appears to be a paucity of reported
cases that consider the allowance of punitive damages in products liability cases." Annot.,
Allowance ofPunitive Damages in ProductsLiability Cases, 29 A.L.R.3d 1021, 1022 (1970).
127. Recently, juries have assessed punitive damages in products liability cases of $125
million, Richard Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., (Orange Cty. Sup. Ct., Calif., February 6,
1978); $17.25 million, Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416
(1974), and $10.5 million, Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., No. 202, 715 (Super. Ct. Santa
Clara County, Calif., March 8, 1972) (unpublished opinion, June 7, 1972), aft'd No. 32,999,
Cal. App. 1st Dist., Feb. 24, 1976, cert. denied, Sup. Ct. Cal. (1976).
Although these awards were subsequently reversed or reduced, in Hayman v. Arcon, Inc.,
Civil No. 70-3226 (20th Jud. Cir. St. Clair County, Ill., filed Apr. 30, 1970), a $5 million punitive damage award was upheld. The problem is that the juries do not understand (or will not
abide by) the policy considerations behind an award of punitive damages. That so many of
these jury assessments are reduced on appeal indicates that the jury should not make the
award at all. See notes 141-44 and accompanying text infra.
128. "The sheer magnitude of recent verdicts must also raise the question of whether an
individual plaintiff should receive millions in excess of his actual damages, when the punishable conduct is also detrimental to society as a whole." DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal
Injury, Products Liability andProfessionalMalpractice Cases." Bonanza or Disaster' 43 INs.
COUNSEL J. 344, 350 (1976).

129.

Kircher, supra note 20, at 301.

130.

L. FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN, 3 PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 33.0117 at 302 (1979).

131. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) (rejecting
punitive damages for personal injuries from taking a drug developed by defendant manufacturer for lowering blood cholesteral levels); Comment Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability
Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895, 919 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Punitive Damages].
132. See, e.g., Mahew v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166, 170 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
133. Punitive Damages,supra note 130 at 919. see note 130 upra

unfamiliar with the financial status of the defendant; 34 and (5) the
responsibility theme is violated because defendants are at best only
consistent with deterrence and
accidentally made to pay that amount
1 35
defendant.
that
of
punishment
B.

Complicity Rule and ALA ProposalRejected

To remedy this situation two suggestions have been advanced,
both involving the standard for imposing punitive damages. Under
the "complicity rule" proposed by the Interagency Task Force Report on Products Liability, 136 punitive damages would be imposed
upon a corporation "only where there is proof that a superior officer
has ordered, participated in, or ratified the misconduct of a lower
level employee."' 3 7 The second proposal is before the Pennsylvania
House, and would restrict punitive damages to those defendants who
"personally acted out of hatred or spite directed toward the plaintiff
or knowingly acted in flagrant and gross disregard of public health
and safety."' 138 Punitive damages shall be available "only if the
plaintiff establishes all the elements of the cause of action for puni' 39
tive or exemplary damages by clear and convincing evidence."'
Proof of gross negligence will not be sufficient in itself to invoke the

imposition of punitive damages.
These proposals make it more difficult if not impossible to impose punitive damages. But the real problem underlying punitive
damages is notfrequency but amount. The concern is not that fewer
people are punished but that people being punished are done so ra0
tionally. 14
134. See generally Fridman, Punitive Damages in Tort, 48 CAN. B. REV. 373 (1970); Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1931).
135. See note 127 supra.
136. ITFR, supra note 4, at 60.
137. Id
138. Pa. H. No. 1083, § 8363(a), Printer's No. 1209, 1979 Sess. (Apr. 25, 1979).
139. Id at § 8363(b).
140. It may not even be clear that the standards will reduce the frequency of claims or that
it would impose a higher standard at all. The language "ordered, participated in, or ratified"
can be liberally construed by courts to mean that almost any act by a lower level employee was
"ratified," by urging that the superior officer has a duty to know what was happening at his
plant. The failure to inspect and supervise might be a tacit acquiescence, leading to a ratification. Furthermore, if the standard of proof of section 402A were applied to this punitive damages determination, a presumption might arise that the superior officers "ordered, participated
in, or ratified" a malicious act of the employee, forcing the officer to come forward to rebut it.
It is certainly arguable that "knowingly acted in flagrant and gross disregard of public
health and safety" connotes the same standard as "clear knowledge of a highly probable risk
of serious harm." "Knowingly acted" is arguably the same as "clear knowledge" since if one
clearly knows something he would be acting knowingly.
These semantical differences may not be needed at all, given the already built-in requirement that the punitive damages bear a "reasonable relationship to the actual damage." Proper
use of this concept should prevent unconscionable results.

C. Suggested Proposal
What is needed is a method of restricting the amount of puni-

tive damages; making a more informed judgment of the amounts to
be imposed; and insuring that punitive damages bear a "reasonable
relationship to the amount of actual damages." The best approach
appears to be a system whereby the jury decides whether punitive
4
damages should be imposed, and the judge decides the amount.' 1

This approach has several advantages over the traditional jury
method of awarding punitive damages. First, a judge is less likely to
be unduly influenced by emotion and could thereby render a more
objective decision.1 42 Second, evidence of the wealth of the manufacturer, which may influence the jury on the liability issue, will be
removed from their hearing. 4 3 Third, judges can apply their experience in criminal sentencing to the punitive damage award, in order
to best effectuate deterrent and punitive purposes. 144 Last, a judge is,
by training and experience, better able to calculate the long term
effects of the imposition of punitive damages in the particular case at
45
hand. 1
Thus, this approach has the flexibility to assure that punitive
damages punish the malicious manufacturer, and is consistent with
the responsibility theme by insuring that those who should be punished are punished.
141. DuBois, supra note 127 at 352-53. The author's rationale and advantages of this
approach are as follows:
There are many advantages to transferring the "power to punish" from the jury
to the trial judge.
The trial judge has also heard the evidence, but will be much less apt to succumb
to the psychological tendency to punish with abandon. The court can bifurcate evidence of the defendant's financial status, which would remove the risk that a "Robin
Hood" philosophy will be implemented. Evidence of the potential economic effects
of a punitive verdict may be better understood by a trial judge, who has the advantage of understanding the judicial history of the purpose of punitive damages. The
defendant can fully try the economic issues, without feeling prejudiced, by conceding
that an exemplary award may be a possibility. Finally, as in a criminal case where
the trial judge fixes the sentence, the court is, by experience and training, better able
to compare the defendant's conduct with that of contemporaries, and to better appreciate the effect, such as multiple verdicts. And there remains the remedy of appellate
review, which should be simplified and assisted by the trial judge's written statement
of the reasons for his decision.
142. Owen, PunitiveDamages in ProductsLiability Litigation,74 MICH. L. REV. 1258, 1320
(1976). This author points out the irony in permitting the jury to award punitive damages.
According to traditional learning, the jury cannot award such damages unless it concludes that the defendant's conduct was "outrageous."... But outrage is undoubtedly an emotion of passion and, therefore, if the jury is outraged by the defendant's
conduct the verdict will have to be reversed as the product of passion. . . . Thus, the
basis for punitive damages comes perilously close to being the basis for their reversal
as well.
Id at 1320, note 304. See also note 127 supra.
143. Owen, supra note 142 at 1320; DuBois, supra note 128 at 352. This same advantage
could be accomplished of course through use of a bifurcated trial.
144. See note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts.- A Reappraisalof Punitive
Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, 1171 (1966).
145. Owen, supra note 141, at 1321-22; DuBois, supra note 128 at 353.

V.

Conclusion

This comment has attempted to demonstrate that despite a surface anomaly, fault concepts do and should have a major role to play
in strict products liability actions. The maintenance of an appropriate apportionment of responsibility is a concern that should be considered when procedural and substantive aspects of strict liability are
examined in products liability legislation and case law.
Ideally a life expectancy statute of limitations should be created
since that is the approach most consistent with the responsibility
theme. Until this approach becomes feasible, however, retaining a
cause of action in negligence after a twelve-year strict liability period, or establishing a state-operated insurance fund to finance
claims after the twelve-year period, are viable alternatives. A pure
comparative fault system should be applied to all strict liability actions, whether between manufacturer and plaintiff or manufacturer
and employer, to assure the most equity consistent with the responsibility theme. Punitive damages awards should be made by an informed judge in order that the damages accurately reflect a penal
result.
Responsibility should be the keynote to strict products liability
actions. Each employer, employee, manufacturer, consumer and
user should be, as practical as possible, responsible for the results of
his own faulty actions. Only then can deterrence truly come into
play, and with it, incentive for safety.
CHARLES

K.

SERINE

